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ABSTRACT
Data compression is ubiquitous to any information and com-
munication system. It often reduces resources required to
store and transmit data. However, the efficiency of com-
pression algorithms also makes them an obvious target for
hackers to mount denial-of-service attacks. In this work,
we consider decompression quines, a specific class of com-
pressed files that decompress to themselves. We analyze all
the known decompression quines by studying their struc-
tures, and their impact on anti-viruses. Our analysis reveals
that most of the anti-viruses do not have a suitable architec-
ture in place to detect decompression quines. Even worse,
some of them are vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks ex-
ploiting quines. Motivated by our findings, we study several
quine detectors and propose a new one that exploits the fact
that quines and non-quine files do not share the same un-
derlying structure. Our evaluation against different datasets
shows that the detector incurs no performance overhead at
the expense of a low false positive rate.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In a world of digital storage and transmission, the den-
sity of information within a piece of data is crucial to any
information and communication system. To this end, data
compression is a useful tool since it effectively reduces re-
sources required to store and transmit data. The popularity
of data compression can be easily judged from a W3C 2016
report which states that 68% of websites on the Internet
support compression [18] and hence are capable of sending
compressed data over the network.
Use of any effective compression algorithm however also
comes with the attached security risks. The so-called de-
compression bombs also known as the zip of death exploit
the efficiency of compression algorithms to mount denial-
of-service (DoS) attacks. They often target web servers
and anti-viruses. Unfortunately, despite the fact that these
threats have been known for years, some security products
still remain vulnerable [9, 13].
The common definition of a decompression bomb found in
the NIST guide [10] or the textbook [11] considers a small
innocuous compressed file that decompresses to a gigantic
file. A typical example of a decompression bomb is 42.zip1
(≈ 42 Kilobytes) that expands to 4.5 Petabytes. When a
software attempts to naively decompress such a file, it con-
sumes all the available memory and eventually crashes.
Decompression bombs are not restricted to the previous
definition. In fact, they can be far more dangerous. The
previous definition is often associated to bombs that decom-
press to a finite number of files. It is also possible to design
bombs that decompress to an infinite number of files. The
idea is to target software packages which decompress files
recursively in order to recover all the data. In this case, an
adversary can submit the bomb to force the software into
running an infinite decompression loop. Such bombs can be
characterized as a compressed file that decompresses to it-
self. We call this particular kind of bomb a decompression
quine. This designation respects the original definition of
quines found in Thompson’s seminal paper [17]. It is worth
noting that a decompression quine can also be viewed as a
fixed point of the decompression function.
In this work, we present a comprehensive analysis of the
known decompression quines for the deflate [5] algorithm.
deflate is currently implemented in several popular com-
pression routines such as gzip, zlib and zip among others.
Based on our study of the existing quines, we generalize the
idea presented in [2] to create new ones. The generalization
allows us to produce an arbitrary quine inexpensively. Ad-
ditionally, it renders the obvious signature-based detection
impossible. We further conduct experiments with several
anti-viruses and incident response frameworks and observe
that some of them implement a detector which requires sev-
eral decompressions to identify a quine. To this end, we also
propose a new detection scheme for quines. The underlying
objective is to design a faster detector than the ad-hoc ones.
We propose a statistical detector, where the core idea is to
parse compressed files to recover the internal block structure
of deflate. We also test the performance of our detector
against a corpus of compressed files. The results show that
the statistical detector is systematically more efficient than
the ad-hoc detectors that include a fixed-point detector and
a detector based on bounded recursion. The efficiency of our
detector comes at the expense of a low false positive rate.
2. RELATED WORK
The first strike of decompression bombs occurred in the
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90’s with the goal of mounting a DoS attack against Fi-
doNet systems [12]. Since then, several different types of
decompression bombs have been designed to attack differ-
ent services. Decompression bombs can be broadly classified
into four types: single (large) file bombs, nested bombs, self-
reproducing bombs (decompression quines) and bogus bombs.
The basic single file bomb exploits the efficiency of com-
pression algorithms: a large file is compressed into a very
small file. The website https://bomb.codes provides several
examples of such bombs for the most popular compression
formats. These compressed files are designed to crash soft-
ware applications by consuming all the available memory.
Nested bombs are a composition of single file bombs. They
are obtained by using archivers such as zip or tar. An
example of a nested bomb is 42.zip. The file has a nested
level of 6. Each level other than the last one consists of 16
zipped files. The files at the last level have a size of 4.2 GB.
Self-reproducing bombs or decompression quines are the
focus of our work. A (decompression) quine is a compressed
file that decompresses to itself. The threat posed by a quine
during decompression is that it may force the software ap-
plication to fall into an infinite loop and thus create a DoS
exploit. The first decompression quine was provided by
Cox [2]. The existence of a decompression quine also means
that it is possible to find two different compressed files that
decompress to the same file: r.gz decompresses to r.gz and
so does r.gz.gz. The work by Cox [2] is the starting point
of our study and it is analyzed in depth in the next section.
Finally, bogus bombs target errors and bugs in the imple-
mentation of the decompression algorithm. In 2005, Chris
Evans handcrafted a special bzip2 file (http://scary.beasts.
org/misc/bomb.bz2) that causes an infinite loop in the de-
compression algorithm of bzip2.
AERAsec Network Services and Security has published
the first survey [15] on the threat of decompression bombs.
It targets anti-viruses, web browsers and office suites using
compressed binary files, compressed HTML and image files
(such as PNG). Forensic tools are also an obvious target of
decompression bombs. bulk_extractor due to Garfinkel [7]
is one of the few tools hardened against this threat. In 2014,
Koret [9] repeated the tests of AERAsec on anti-viruses. The
author observed that despite the long history of decompres-
sion bombs, some anti-viruses were still vulnerable. Pelle-
grino et al. have discovered in [14] new vulnerabilities re-
lated to compression/decompression in HTTP, XMPP and IMAP
protocols (server side). More recently at BlackHat 2016,
Cara [13] has extended the results of [15] to the most pop-
ular image formats and compression formats supported by
web browsers.
The countermeasures often mentioned in [9, 13, 14, 15]
to thwart decompression bombs is to set two limits. The
first limit is on the size of the decompressed file. It protects
against single file bombs. The second is to limit the number
of times a file can be decompressed. It protects against
nested bombs and self-reproducing bombs. These two limits
have been used in Arbomb, the first decompression bomb
detector [3].
All the related work on the impact of decompression bombs
mainly focus on single file bombs and nested bombs. They
however do acknowledge the existence of self-reproducing
compressed files by citing the work of Cox [2]. Our goal is
to study quines on software applications that allow recursive
decompression. This leads to the obvious choice of testing
against anti-viruses since they are designed to scan files and
directories recursively.
3. DEFLATE QUINES
deflate [5] is a lossless compression algorithm imple-
mented in several popular compression routines including
gzip, zlib and zip. We note that while, the term inflate
has been used in the literature to refer to the associated
decompression algorithm, in popular use though, the term
deflate often subsumes both compression and decompres-
sion algorithms. We also abide by the usage of the term
deflate to take both denotations.
In this section, we first present an overview of deflate
and then in the sequel, we present decompression quines
based on deflate.
3.1 Deflate Compression
deflate is based on the LZ77 compression algorithm [19]
and the Huffman coding [8]. In fact, LZ77 is the core com-
pression algorithm, the output of which is further compressed
using Huffman coding.
The idea underpinning LZ77 compression is to find se-
quences of data that are repeated. This is implemented
in practice by maintaining a record of the previously seen
data. To this end, a sliding window is employed. When-
ever a next sequence of bytes is identical to one that can
be found in the sliding window, the sequence is replaced
by a pointer where it can be found in the window. The
pointer is of the form <distance,length>. The distance
value measures how far back into the window the sequence
starts, while length counts the number of bytes for which
the sequence is identical. Replacing a long sequence of bytes
by a pointer effectively compresses the data sequence.
The deflate specification states that the length value is
drawn from [3, 258] while the value for distance is drawn
from [1, 32768]. With these parameters, the window size is
the maximum distance value, i.e., 32,768 bytes.
Once, the data is compressed using LZ77, the output is
coded using Huffman encoding [8]. Two different variants
of Huffman coding are available in deflate: static and dy-
namic (briefly discussed below).
Compressed data in deflate are grouped into blocks.
There are three types of blocks depending upon the kind
of compression applied to the data included into it:
• Uncompressed blocks (STORED). Such a block is com-
posed of a 2-byte field which contains the number of
data bytes in the block. Another adjacent 2-byte field
stores the one’s complement of the previous field used
to validate the length. This is followed by the uncom-
pressed data. We note that no compression whatsoever
(not even LZ77) is applied on the data. Uncompressed
blocks are limited to 65,535 bytes.
• Compressed blocks with a static Huffman code
(STATIC). The code is defined using several fixed ta-
bles. It is to note that the Huffman coded data is
pre-compressed using LZ77.
• Compressed blocks with a dynamic Huffman
code (DYNAMIC). The file is parsed during runtime to
create a frequency table of symbols. The data is then
encoded with this specific table. The block first con-
tains this table that is needed for decompression, which
is followed by the compressed data and finally the lit-
eral 256 encoded using the table to mark the end of
the block. Again, the data in these blocks are pre-
compressed using LZ77.
Each block starts with a 3-bit header. The bits are read
from right to left (Big endian encoding). When the first bit
of the header is set to one, it indicates that this is the last
block of the file. The last two bits of the header are used
to specify the block type: uncompressed block (00), static
Huffman compressed (01) or dynamic Huffman compressed
(10). The compression algorithm terminates a block when
it determines that starting a new block would be useful, or
when the block size fills up the compression block buffer.
The deflate algorithm has been implemented in different
compression routines such as gzip and zip. Each routine
implements its own algorithm to determine which block type
needs to be used.
3.2 Quines
A quine (native to programming languages) is defined as a
self-reproducing program, i.e., when executed, the program
should generate an output that is identical to its source code.
To some extent, a compressed file can also be seen as a pro-
gram which outputs a result, i.e., the corresponding decom-
pressed file. Hence, a quine for a decompression algorithm
is a compressed file which decompresses to itself.
In fact, there is a subtle difference between a regular pro-
gram and a compressed file. It stems from the fact that
the source code of a regular program can be a simple text
file, while a compressed file most certainly has a well defined
header and a footer (See Appendix A for different file format
specifications). The header and footer are required for the
file to be correctly interpreted during decompression. For a
compressed file, let us use H to denote the header and F for
the footer. Using these notations, the actual source code in
the context of a decompression quine is the compressed data
that lies between H and F .
We note that a quine must generate the same header and
the same footer upon decompression. However, when de-
compression is applied on a quine, the header and the footer
part are eventually removed and only the code part gets de-
compressed (or in other words gets executed). As a conse-
quence, for a decompression quine to be valid, the code part
must generate itself and in addition it should also generate
the header and the footer.
3.2.1 The LZ77 Language
The reason behind the existence of a quine is that the un-
derlying compression algorithm can be viewed as a pseudo
language with a small set of instructions. In fact, the task of
constructing a quine essentially reduces to the task of iden-
tifying the underlying language. In this section, we present
the LZ77 language due to Cox [2]. The language forms the
core of any known quines based on deflate. The language
has two instructions:
• literal(n) followed by n bytes: write these n bytes
as the output. For instance, literal(3)foo → foo.
• repeat(d,n) which represents a <distance,length>
pointer: copy the n bytes found d bytes backward from
the current position of the output to the output. For
instance, if the output at a given instant is: incant
abracad, then repeat(7,4) → incant abracadabra.
In the rest of this section, we use the notation Ln for lit-
eral(n), Rd,n for repeat(d,n) and Rn for repeat(n,n).
The operator L0 is also used but gives no output. It should
be apparent that LZ77 compression indeed builds upon the
afore-described instructions. In fact, an Ln instruction rep-
resents a non-compressed data, while an Rn/Rd,n instruc-
tion represents a compressed data. The values d, n corre-
spond to the <distance,length> pointers of the LZ77 com-
pression.
The language can be used to write the code part of a
deflate generated compressed file and for that matter an
LZ77 quine. Once, the desired code part is found, a suitable
header and footer pair can be manually plugged into the file.
We note that the language completely ignores the Huffman
encoding that is applied atop LZ77 compression, hence it
cannot exactly be considered as a well constructed deflate
compressed file. As a matter of fact, constructing a deflate
quine essentially boils down to constructing a LZ77 quine.
This is because, once an LZ77 quine is found, the data can
then be easily grouped into blocks and appropriate Huffman
coding can be applied. Hence, in the rest of the discussion
we neither consider the block structure of deflate nor the
Huffman coding.
Example 1. We now present a simple example to illus-
trate the basic idea to generate a quine in this language. It is
given in Table 1. The example presents a code that generates
itself without the header and the footer. After the execution
of the first instruction, the output lags behind the code by
one instruction (since the execution of L0 yields nothing).
After executing the second instruction, this lag increases to
two instructions. The lag remains unchanged after the third
instruction. The fourth instruction reduces the lag back to
one. The interesting core of this self-producing code is the
instruction number five, L4 R4,3 L4 R4,3 L4, which is
in fact a palindrome. The palindrome property of the in-
struction allows it to recurse back to a previously appeared
instruction of the output. It is evident that any Ln instruc-
tion increases the lag while any Rd,n decreases it.
In the following section, we present a complete construc-
tion for a known quine which includes the necessary header
and footer.
3.2.2 Known Quines
Currently, we know six quines for compressed files which
use deflate:
1. droste.zip2: a zip quine,
2. r.gz: a gzip quine proposed by Russ Cox [2]. It uses
the same general construction as r.tar.gz and r.zip,
3. r.tar.gz: a tarball quine proposed by Russ Cox. It
has the same construction as r.gz and r.zip,
4. r.zip: a zip quine proposed by Russ Cox. It has the
same construction as r.gz and r.tar.gz,
5. rec_fix.gz: a gzip quine proposed by Mahaly Barasz
(as a part of comments given on [2]). It contains free
bytes which can take any value and yet remain a quine,
6. rec_tst.gz: a gzip quine very similar to r.gz, with
rec_tst.gz in the filename option to replace recur-
sive as in r.gz. It also comes from the comments
given on [2].
2https://alf.nu/ZipQuine
Table 1: A simple example of a quine code. Both the instructions Ln and Rd,n require 1 byte. In bold, the arguments of
the Ln instruction. Note that the columns Code and Code Output have the same byte sequence.
Comment Code Code Output
1. print nothing L0
2. print 4 bytes L0 L4 L0 L4 L4 L0 L4 L0 L4 L0 L4 L0 L4
3. print nothing L0
4. go 4 bytes back in the output and repeat the next 3 bytes R4,3 L0 L4 L0
5. print 4 bytes R4,3 L4 R4,3 L4 L4 R4,3 L4 R4,3 L4 R4,3 L4 R4,3 L4
6. go 4 bytes back in the output and repeat the next 3 bytes R4,3 R4,3 L4 R4,3
Table 2: Quine construction for rec_fix.gz. H is a header of length 18 bytes, F a footer of length 8 bytes and FP are free
bytes of length 4. Ln is encoded using 5 bytes while Rd,n using 3 bytes. In bold, the arguments of the Ln instruction.
Comment Code Code Output
1. print 23 bytes H (18 bytes) L23 (5 bytes) L23 H L23 H L23
2. go 23 bytes back in the output and repeat the
next 15 bytes
R23,15 H[1..15]
3. print 16 bytes H[16..18] (3 bytes) L23
(5 bytes) R23,15 (3 bytes) L16 (5 bytes)
L16 H[16..18] L23 R23,15 L16 H[16..18] L23 R23,15 L16
4. repeat the 16 previous bytes of the output R16 H[16..18] L23 R23,15 L16
5. print 16 bytes R16 (3 bytes) L16 (5 bytes)
R16 (3 bytes) L16 (5 bytes)
L16 R16 L16 R16 L16 R16 L16 R16 L16
6. repeat the 16 previous bytes R16 R16 L16 R16 L16
7. print 16 bytes FP (4 bytes) R12 (3 bytes) 00
(1 byte) F (8 bytes)
L16 FP R12 00 F FP R12 00 F
8. repeat the 12 previous bytes R12 R12 00 F
9. add extra padding 00 (Padding)
We note that there exist some quine variants such as the
file rec_dup.gz (see the comment section of [2]). The file
is an “ever expanding quine” in the sense that the file upon
decompression generates a .gz file twice the size of the orig-
inal file. Hence, if a recursive decompression is applied on
the initial file, at each recursion step, one obtains a file twice
as large as the file at the previous recursion step.
In this section, we focus on the construction used in the
quine rec_fix.gz. The construction of other quines essen-
tially follows the same pattern. It assumes that the Ln
instruction is coded using 5 bytes and the Rd,n instruction
using 3 bytes. It is also assumed that we have a header H of
18 bytes and a footer F of 8 bytes. The header and footer
size respect the .gz file format (details on the header and
footer specifications can be found in Appendix A).
In order to present the code in a readable form, we further
use the shorthand H[i..j] to collectively represent all the
(j − i + 1) bytes between the ith and the jth byte of the
header H. The notation FP is used to denote the four free
bytes available in rec_fix.gz. We recall that free bytes can
take any value while maintaining the quine property. The
quine construction is shown in Table 2.
One can easily verify that the output sequence is exactly
the same as that of the content in the code except that the
output additionally has the header H in the beginning and
the footer F at the end. To understand how the construc-
tion works, one may notice that at the first instruction, the
output lags behind the code by H L23. In the second in-
struction, the output is behind by the sequence H[16..18]
L23 R23,15. The next two instructions allow the output
to catch up on this delay. This is followed by a succession of
R16 L16 which reverses the situation with the code behind
the output. At the end, we have the code and the output at
the same point with the footer in addition (in the output).
The padding is used to have enough bytes for the seventh
instruction. Even, in this complete construction, the palin-
drome L16 R16 L16 R16 L16 in the fifth instruction plays
a crucial role.
3.2.3 A Generalization
The problem with the previous quine construction is the
constraint that the header must be 18 bytes long. We pro-
pose in this section a natural generalization to this construc-
tion for a header of any arbitrary length.
First, we define p the length of the header H and k an
integer such that k = p − 3. In fact, the header must be of
a length greater than 3 bytes (due to the file format speci-
fication, see Appendix A for further detail), hence we have
p ≥ 3. The generalized quine construction is given in Ta-
ble 3. As in the previous construction, the Ln instruction
must be coded using 5 bytes, while, the Rd,n instruction
using 3 bytes.
4. QUINES VERSUS ANTI-VIRUSES
All the quines presented in the previous section were tested
on three online anti-virus aggregators (Virus Total, Jotti
and VirScan), on two incident response frameworks (Mas-
tiff v0.7.1 and Viper v0.12.9) and on several anti-viruses
(see Table 4 and Table 5). The tests were conducted in
August 2016.
Online anti-virus aggregators allow a user to submit files
to be checked by several anti-viruses. Our goal was to de-
termine if quines were detected by anti-viruses and if yes,
identify the method employed.
VirusTotal (www.virustotal.com) is operated by Google
and it aggregates 54 anti-viruses. It is by far the most pop-
ular online anti-virus aggregator. Jotti (virusscan.jotti.org)
and VirScan (www.virscan.org) aggregate 19 and 39 anti-
viruses respectively. The information on the different anti-
viruses including their version are available for VirScan. It
Table 3: Construction for the generalization of rec_fix.gz. H is a header of length p bytes, F a footer of length 8 bytes
and FP are free bytes of length 4. Ln is encoded using 5 bytes while Rd,n using 3 bytes. In bold, the arguments of the Ln
instruction.
Comment Code Code Output
1. print p+5 bytes H (p bytes) L23 (5 bytes) Lp+5 H Lp+5 H Lp+5
2. go p+5 bytes back in the output and repeat
the next k bytes
Rp+5,k H[1..k]
3. print 16 bytes H[k+1..p] (3 bytes) Lp+5
(p+5 bytes) Rp+5,k (3 bytes) L16 (5 bytes)
L16 H[k+1..p] Lp+5 Rp+5,k L16 H[k+1..p] Lp+5 Rp+5,k L16
4. repeat the 16 previous bytes of the output R16 H[k+1..p] Lp+5 Rp+5,k L16
5. print 16 bytes R16 (3 bytes) L16 (5 bytes)
R16 (3 bytes) L16 (5 bytes)
L16 R16 L16 R16 L16 R16 L16 R16 L16
6. repeat the 16 previous bytes R16 R16 L16 R16 L16
7. print 16 bytes FP (4 bytes) R12 (3 bytes) 00
(1 byte) F (8 bytes)
L16 FP R12 00 F FP R12 00 F
8. repeat the 12 previous bytes R12 R12 00 F
9. add extra padding 00 (Padding)
is important to note that aggregators may use a common
anti-virus but not necessarily the same version. This may
eventually produce inconsistent behavior across the aggre-
gators for the same anti-virus.
The result of the submission of the quine to the aggrega-
tors and incident response frameworks is given in Table 4.
We first observe that quines are detected only by a few anti-
viruses. Let us first start with the zip quine droste.zip.
This quine is detected as a decompression bomb by Sophos,
ESET in VirusTotal and Jotti. Qihoo 360 also detects it in
Jotti and VirScan. The second quine tested was r.zip. It
is only detected by Sophos in Jotti only and not by ESET
and Qihoo 360. Sophos being used by all the aggregators,
we observe an inconsistent behavior which might be caused
by the different setups or versions of the anti-virus.
At this step of our analysis, we may conclude that Qihoo
360 and ESET employ a signature-based detection. These
anti-viruses maintain a list of signatures of known bombs
and check whether a given file has a signature that belongs
to the list. Zoner (for VirusTotal) and F-Secure (for Jotti)
are not able to provide an analysis for both files (53 answers
out of 54 for VirusTotal and 18 out of 19 for Jotti). It means
that they can be a potential victim of a decompression quine.
Table 4: Quine detection by anti-virus aggregators and in-
cident response frameworks. x/y means that x out of y
anti-viruses detected the file as a quine. X for detecting the
file as a quine, while 7 for not doing so. ∞ implies that the
tool ran an infinite recursion loop.
Quine
Agregators and Frameworks
VirusTotal Jotti VirScan Mastiff Viper
droste.zip 3/53 2/18 1/39 ∞ 7
r.zip 0/53 1/18 0/39 ∞ 7
rec_tst.gz 0/54 1/19 0/39 7 7
rec_fix.gz 0/54 1/19 0/39 7 7
r.tar.gz 0/54 0/19 0/39 7 7
r.gz 0/54 1/19 0/39 7 X
In the second step of our analysis, we look at gzip quines.
Most of the time, all the gzip quines are declared as safe.
Sophos in Jotti is the only anti-virus that identifies all gzip
quines except r.tar.gz. A possible explanation behind why
Sophos misses r.tar.gz could be that the tar archive for-
mat is not well supported by most anti-viruses. Otherwise,
Sophos detects decompression quines in a consistent way. To
understand how it works, we took a safe file and compressed
it several times. We submitted the resulting compressed
file to Jotti. It appears that after compressing the file 6
times, Sophos declared it to be a decompression bomb. We
can safely assume that the decompression bomb detector in
Sophos is similar to the Python code provided in Code 1.
Code 1: Quine detector with a recursion bound. 
1 #!/usr/bin/python
2
3 import sys
4 import zlib
5
6 magic_nb="\x1f\x8b\x08"
7 MAX=6
8
9 def uncompress(data,depth):
10 if data.startswith(magic_nb) and depth<MAX:
11 original=zlib.decompress(data,zlib.
MAX_WBITS|16)
12 uncompress(original ,depth+1)
13 else:
14 if depth>=MAX:
15 print "Quine"
16 sys.exit()
17 else:
18 return data
19
20 with open(sys.argv[1]) as f:
21 data=f.read()
22 uncompress(data,0)
23 f.close() 
We also analyzed a malware analysis tool named yextend3
that is based on yara4 — a pattern matching tool to an-
alyze malware files. yextend employs a detector identical
to Code 1 to identify decompression bombs. The default re-
cursion bound is set to 42 but can be tuned by the end user.
It is pertinent to note that yara is also used by VirusTotal.
Table 4 also provides the result on incident response frame-
works. It appears that Mastiff recursively decompresses
zip files (but not gzip files). droste.zip and r.zip are
3https://github.com/BayshoreNetworks/yextend
4http://virustotal.github.io/yara/
both decompressed infinitely many times by Mastiff. The
only positive detection obtained was by Viper for r.gz.
We have also directly studied the behavior of 12 anti-
viruses on a computer running Microsoft Windows 10 (see Ta-
ble 5 for the list).
Table 5: Impact of quines on several anti-viruses running
on Microsoft Windows 10. 7 denotes that the tool could
not detect the quine, while ∞ denotes that the tool most
probably ran into an infinite recursion.
Anti-viruses Version Six quines tested
Ad-Aware 11.12.945.9202 7
Avast 12.2.2276 7
Avira 15.0.18.354 7
AVG 16.101.7752 7
Baidu 5.4.3.147185 7
ClamWin 0.99.1 7
Comodo 8.4.0.5068 7
FortiClient 5.00233 7
Panda 16.1.3 ∞
Smadav 10.8 7
Trend Micro 10.0.1150 7
Windows Defender 1.225.361.0 7
The results remain very similar to those observed on anti-
virus aggregators: quines are largely undetected. The only
notable result is that during the analysis of each quine on
Panda, the anti-virus always indicated a scanned file of around
2000 bytes (but often different at each run) before a com-
plete crash of the software.
In conclusion, quines are largely undetected by most anti-
viruses. Several of them including the framework Mastiff,
anti-viruses Panda, Zoner (from VirusTotal) and F-Secure
are still vulnerable to quines. Sophos has the most rational
method to detect quines while Qihoo 360 and ESET only
employ signatures of known quines as a detection tool.
5. QUINE DETECTORS
As seen in the previous section, anti-viruses in general do
not have a suitable architecture in place to detect quines.
The limited few which do detect quines either employ a
signature based technique or recursively decompress with a
pre-defined or configurable bound on the depth. Our quine
generalization of Table 3 clearly defeats any signature based
detector. A naive recursive decompression with bounded
depth is however inefficient as it requires several calls to the
decompression routine. Moreover, it also entails false posi-
tives. In this section, we study several ad-hoc detectors and
propose a new one.
5.1 Employing Memoization
Dynamic programming techniques and particularly mem-
oization can improve the efficiency of a recursive decom-
pression detector. In fact, memoization can avoid requiring
to decompress multiple times the same file. The idea is to
memoize the hash of a compressed file and whenever a new
file needs to be decompressed, its hash is first checked in
the memo table (which also stores a pointer to the decom-
pressed file). If the hash has been previously seen, the extra
decompression can be avoided by replicating the previously
decompressed data.
Memoization is ideal for nested bombs such as 42.zip.
This technique has indeed been employed in practice (see [7]
for a use case). It can also reduce the number of decompres-
sions to detect a quine in Code 1. However, it increases
(depending on the implementation) the memory cost or the
CPU cost for non-quine files without any additional benefit
(the extra computation are unlikely to be reused). Further-
more, since memoization is based on identifying identical
piece of compressed data, it can easily be made useless by
creating bombs where internal files differ by a byte.
Since hashing is the core primitive of a memoization based
detector, we compare the efficiency of decompression and
hashing. Our implementation is in Python and it uses gzip
as the compression routine and SHA-256 as the hash func-
tion. The tests were performed on a 64-bit processor lap-
top computer powered by an Intel Core i7-4600U CPU at
2.10GHz with 4MB cache, 8GB RAM and running Linux 3.13.0-
36-generic. We employ the same machine throughout this
paper.
We conduct tests on three datasets. Our first dataset in-
cludes two standard lossless data compression corpora namely,
Silesia [4] and Canterbury [1]. These corpora provide datasets
of files that cover the typical data types used in practice and
hence are useful to test compression algorithms. The Can-
terbury corpus is an old corpus dating back to 1997. The
corpus contains 11 files of sizes less than 1 MB. The more
recent Silesia corpus on the other hand contains larger files,
between 5 MB to 49 MB. A summary of the contents of
these corpora is given in Appendix C. The dataset also in-
cludes some other files available on the Canterbury corpus
webpage5. In total, the first dataset contains 44 files. The
second dataset is a set of 1071 files filled with random bytes.
Files in the dataset have increasing sizes starting from 1KB
to 50MB. The third dataset contains the same number of
files having the same sizes, but are filled with 0x00. In or-
der to compare the efficiency of hashing and decompression,
we first compress the files in each dataset using gzip, and
measure the time required to decompress the output; the
time to hash the compressed file and the time required to
hash the decompressed file.
In Fig. 1, we plot the time to hash the compressed file
and the time to hash the decompressed file as a percentage
of the time required for decompression. We observe that
13% of the files from the first dataset require more time to
hash the uncompressed file than decompression. Hashing a
compressed file is relatively cheaper yet entails a consider-
able percentage of the decompression time. In fact, around
34% of the uncompressed files require a hashing time which
is over 25% of the decompression time. As for the second
dataset, all uncompressed files starting from 13 KB require
more time to hash than the time required to decompress
the file. Similarly, all compressed files starting from 11 KB
require more time to hash than the time required to decom-
press the file. As for the third dataset, we observe that all
uncompressed files starting from 15 KB require more time to
hash than the time required to decompress the file. Hashing
compressed files however requires a negligible percentage of
the decompression time.
These experiments clearly demonstrate that hashing of-
ten incurs a considerable cost compared to decompression.
Hence, any detector should carefully use hashing to avoid
introducing any overhead. In the next sections, we study
5http://corpus.canterbury.ac.nz
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Figure 1: Comparison of time required to decompress a file, time to compute the hash of a compressed file and the time to
compute the hash of a decompressed file. The files in all the three figures are sorted in the increasing order of the size. The
reported data is the average over 1000 runs.
two detectors specific to quine detection: fixed-point detec-
tor and statistical detector.
5.2 Fixed-point Detector
The first obvious decompression quine detector consists
in checking whether a given compressed file is a fixed point
of the decompression function. This requires decompressing
the file and checking for equality between the compressed file
and the decompressed file. Clearly, a fixed-point detector
entails no false positives. A Python code for this detector is
given in Code 2. It basically decompresses the file and then
checks if the compressed and the decompressed files have the
same size. If the files have the same size, it computes their
SHA-256 digests to check the equality of their contents.
Code 2: The fixed-point detector 
1 #!/usr/bin/python
2
3 import sys
4 import gzip
5 import hashlib
6
7 with open(sys.argv[1],’rb’) as f:
8 compress=f.read()
9 with gzip.open(sys.argv[1],’rb’) as g:
10 uncompress=g.read()
11 if len(compress)==len(uncompress):
12 dc=hashlib.sha256(compress).digest()
13 du=hashlib.sha256(uncompress).digest()
14 if dc==du:
15 print "Quine"
16 else:
17 print "Safe"
18 else:
19 print "Safe" 
We note that the step in Code 2 that consists in com-
paring the file sizes is critical for the performance of the
detector. In fact, due to the efficiency of the compression
algorithm, the decompressed file can be several order larger
than the compressed one. For instance, in case of gzip, the
compression ratio can be as high as 1032:1. Therefore, the
computation of the SHA-256 digest of the decompressed file
can be very costly. The a priori comparison of the file sizes
eliminates costly digest computations for compressed files
which are not quines.
The detector is very simple and performs well on most of
the files it may encounter. However, there exists a class of
compressed files for which it is rather inefficient. It is a class
of large files for which the compressed and decompressed
files are of the same size. In this case, the computation
of the SHA-256 digests is unfortunately costly. Such files
can be easily generated in practice by taking an arbitrarily
large non-compressed file say example.txt. The file is then
compressed to obtain example.gz. Let us assume that the
size of example.gz is smaller than that of example.txt by
k bytes. One can then change the field FNAME that stores the
uncompressed filename in example.gz to add the remaining
k bytes (see Appendix A for further details on the FNAME
field). It is to note that such a file remains a valid .gz
file. We followed this strategy to generate a 10 GB file.
Hashing the compressed and the uncompressed files took
around 1m40s using the bash sha256sum utility. Clearly,
the time spent by the detector can be made arbitrarily large
by choosing the initial file of suitable size.
We also note that the fixed-point detector is not capable
of detecting quine variants such as rec_dup.gz — a file that
recursively doubles its size upon decompression.
In the next section, we study another detector that does
not require a hash function and takes a decision based on the
ratio of the number of different block types (stored, static
and dynamic). It is also capable of detecting quine variants
such as rec_dup.gz.
5.3 Statistical Detector
We propose a new detector which assumes that a legiti-
mate compression software cannot produce a quine. In case
of a quine the block structure (the type of the block —
stored, static or dynamic, and their order) is manually cho-
sen by a human, while, compression algorithms apply their
own heuristics to decide on the blocks.
In order to illustrate the idea, let us consider the case of
the quine rec_fix.gz. The file has a size of 130 bytes. If we
compress it using either gzip 1.2.4 or zlib 1.2.8, we ob-
tain a compressed file with a single static block. However,
rec_fix.gz itself is composed of 8 blocks as shown in Fig. 2,
where, stored (uncompressed) and static blocks alternate.
Moreover, there are no dynamic blocks. The block structure
of other quines is left to Appendix B.
Figure 2: Structure of rec_fix.gz. The black blocks rep-
resent the header and the footer of the .gz file. The gray
blocks correspond to stored (uncompressed) blocks and the
light gray are compressed with the static Huffman table
(static blocks).
To exploit the difference between the output of a legiti-
mate compression algorithm and the manual design of quines,
we directly analyze their block structure and study the statis-
tics of block types. We use the following notation to denote
the number of different block types:
• U : number of uncompressed blocks;
• S : number of static Huffman blocks;
• D : number of dynamic Huffman blocks;
• T : the total number of blocks (i.e., T = U + S + D).
In order to study the block structure of compressed files,
we use an instrumented version of the gzip compression rou-
tine. The instrumented version is obtained by modifying the
source code such that the decompression routine jumps to
the start of each block, and decodes the block type from
the block header. It is to note that the instrumented code
does not need to write the decompressed data to the disk.
All modifications are limited to the inflate.c file available
in the gzip source code package (version 1.2.4) for Linux.
A similar instrumented library was obtained from the zlib
library for Linux (version 1.2.8).
Using our instrumented gzip routine, we obtain the num-
ber of each block type in all the existing quines. Table 6
summarizes our findings. It is worth noticing that dynamic
blocks are quite rare.
Table 6: Block structures of quines.
Quine U S D T U/T S/T D/T
droste.zip 27 75 1 102 0.26 0.73 0.01
r.zip 12 6 0 18 0.67 0.33 0
rec_fix.gz 4 4 0 8 0.5 0.5 0
rec_tst.gz 11 6 0 17 0.64 0.36 0
r.gz 11 6 0 17 0.64 0.36 0
r.tar.gz 13 7 0 20 0.65 0.35 0
rec_dup.gz 6 5 0 20 0.55 0.45 0
Table 6, also shows the different ratios for quines, namely
U/T , S/T and D/T . As for U/T , results vary from 0.5 to
0.66 for all files except one, droste.zip. In a similar vein,
all files except r.zip have a S/T ratio larger than 0.35, while
all files except droste.zip have a D/T ratio of 0. Clearly,
these ratios are less homogeneous for .zip files, since they
also perform archiving and hence the headers are much more
complex than .gz files.
We hence propose a statistical detector that consists in
using the instrumented code to compute the ratios and re-
porting a compressed file as potentially dangerous if it yields
a U/T ratio larger than or equal to 0.5, or an S/T ratio larger
than or equal to 0.35. The detector comes with the eventual
possibility of having false positives.
In the rest of this section, we evaluate our statistical de-
tector for false positives. To this end, we conduct experi-
ments to study the block structure of safe files. In order to
have a set of safe files, we have built a dataset of 3655 files
from gnu.org. It includes the source code of the different
versions of 338 software packages. We also include the data
compression corpora Silesia and Canterbury.
All the safe files and the files in the corpora were first
compressed using gzip v1.2.4 with default parameters and
then their block structure was determined using the instru-
mented version of the gzip source code. Fig. 3 provides
the statistics on the block types for these files. The first
three plots Fig. 3a, Fig. 3b and Fig. 3c present results on
the 3655 files harvested from gnu.org, while the last three
plots Fig. 3d, Fig. 3e and Fig. 3f present combined results
for the Canterbury and Silesia corpora.
We observe that only three files from the GNU dataset
(Fig. 3a, Fig. 3b and Fig. 3c) have a U/T ratio larger than
0.5. One of these files has a U/T ratio as high as 0.64, the
same as that of rec_tst.gz and r.gz. Moreover, 89% of
the files from the GNU dataset have a U/T ratio of 0. This
shows that the gzip compression routine rarely includes an
uncompressed block. As for the S/T ratio, only one file
surpasses the quine bound of 0.35. This file yields an S/T
ratio of 0.5. Again, 99.7% of the files do not contain any
static block. As for D/T , all files have a ratio larger than
0.37. Hence, the overall false positive rate for this dataset
is 4/3655 = 0.001.
We observe even better results with Canterbury and Sile-
sia corpora (Fig. 3d, Fig. 3e and Fig. 3f). Only one file out
of a total of 23 has a non-zero U/T ratio of 0.0006 (yet much
smaller than the quine bound of 0.5). As for S/T , all files
yield a ratio of 0. And all files except one have a D/T ratio
of 1; the file has a D/T ratio of 0.999. These results show
that all the files from the corpora except one generate a sin-
gle dynamic block that contains all the compressed data.
Hence, the overall false positive rate is 0.
The experiments with the datasets show that the detector
is quite efficient in terms of false positives. In the following
section, we present a limitation that creates a potential to
influence the false positive rate of the detector.
5.3.1 Limitation
The deflate specification [5] allows a compression rou-
tine implementing the algorithm to choose a heuristic to
decide on the block structure. That is, each compression
routine may decide on 1) when to create a new block 2) the
type of block to create. Clearly, compressing using differ-
ent heuristics may produce different statistics on the blocks.
Hence, it is possible to come up with a heuristic that may in-
fluence the false positive rate of our statistical detector. For
instance, one may apply a heuristic to increase the number
of uncompressed blocks such that the ratio U/T surpasses
the quine bound of 0.5. However, such a heuristic is clearly
irrational.
In order to study this limitation, we compare the impact
of the heuristics used in two different compression routines
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Figure 3: Distribution of blocks for safe files. The first three plots present results on the 3655 files harvested from gnu.org,
while the last three plots present combined results for the Canterbury and Silesia corpora.
namely, zlib and gzip. We also study the impact of modify-
ing certain compression parameters in gzip and zlib on the
statistics of blocks. To this end, we note that zlib provides a
parameter memLevel that specifies how much memory should
be allocated for the internal compression state. The parame-
ter partly determines when a new block is created and which
type of block is created. The parameter takes values between
1 and 9. With memLevel=1, the algorithm uses minimum
memory but is slow and yields the smallest compression ra-
tio; memLevel=9 uses maximum memory for optimal speed.
The default value is 8. The value of memLevel can be set to
a desired value using the MAX_MEM_LEVEL macro defined in
the source code. gzip also provides a similar parameter as
a command line option.
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 present the result of modifying the mem-
Level parameter in zlib and gzip respectively. The first
observation being that the two compression routines do not
produce the same distribution of block types. We also ob-
serve that in both the cases, the increase in the value of
memLevel, systematically decreases the ratios U/T and S/T ,
while increasing the ratio D/T . Since the increase in the
value of memLevel leads to higher compression ratios, more
and more blocks with dynamic Huffman coding are created.
A comparison of the two figures shows that for memLevel=1
and memLevel=2, a zlib compressed file yields an S/T ratio
which is higher than the quine bound of 0.35. However, for
these values of memLevel, the gzip compressed file has ratios
much within the quine bound.
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Figure 4: Results on the mozilla file from the Silesia corpus.
The file was compressed using zlib with different values of
memLevel.
These results show that it is possible to choose a specific
parameter setting to skew the distribution of blocks. How-
ever, it would generally yield bad compression ratios.
5.3.2 Performance Comparison
In this section, we study the performance of three detec-
tors: recursive decompression with bounded depth, fixed-
point detector and statistical detector. The detectors use
the gunzip decompression routine. The hash function imple-
mentation in the fixed-point detector comes from the bash
sha256sum utility. In the rest of this section, we report the
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Figure 5: Results on the mozilla file from the Silesia corpus.
The file was compressed using gzip with different values of
memLevel. All U/T and S/T ratios are very close to 0.
time required by the detectors on quines and safe files from
the Silesia corpus (since it is the most recent one). The
reported time is the average over 1000 runs.
In Table 7, we present the result on two quines. The detec-
tor based on recursive decompression with bounded depth
is tested against three values for the bound: 2, 6 and 42.
The first value corresponds to the base test, while the other
two correspond to values currently used in Sophos and yex-
tend respectively. Clearly, the detection time increases with
the bound and the size of the quine. This is essentially
due to the cost of the underlying decompression algorithm.
We also observe that the statistical detector performs better
than the fixed-point detector for both the quines. There are
two reasons to explain this phenomenon: 1) Since the files
under scrutiny are quines, the fixed-point detector needs to
compute the SHA-256 digest of the compressed and uncom-
pressed files. The statistical detector on the other hand does
not require any hashing. 2) Since the fixed-point detector
needs to compute the hash, it has to write the decompressed
data. Writing decompressed files to the disk is an overhead
that is clearly absent in our statistical detector. Comparing
the results on the recursive detector with bounded depth
and the statistical detector, we observe that even for the
bound 2, the statistical detector performs better than the
recursive decompression. This is again due to the fact that
the recursive decompression writes the decompressed data
while the statistical detector does not.
Table 7: Results on two quines. Recursive decompression is
tested for three bounds: 2, 6 and 42.
Time (ms)
recursive
File (size) fixed-pt. 2 6 42 stat.
rec_fix.gz (130B) 5.2 5.3 11.6 65.6 4.7
r.gz (250B) 5.3 6.3 13.0 72.3 3.8
Table 8 presents the results on the detectors for safe files
from the Silesia corpus. For safe files, the recursive decom-
pression is able to detect the file as safe after the first de-
compression. The fixed-point detector needs to write the
decompressed file and compute the size of the compressed
and decompressed files. Again, since the statistical detector
does not require writing the decompressed file, it performs
the best among the three detectors. We observe that the
statistical detector on an average required only 55% of the
time required by the fixed-point detector and only 57% of
that required by the detector based on bounded recursion.
Table 8: Results on files from the Silesia corpus.
Time (ms)
File (size) fixed-point recursive statistical
xml (676K) 52.8 38.0 30.8
reymont (1.8M) 134.1 58.2 45.1
ooffice (3.0M) 108.2 70.1 59.7
nci (3.1M) 367.7 221.1 131.3
mr (3.6M) 158.7 121.1 76.0
osdb (3.6M) 100.8 124.8 74.6
dickens (3.7M) 106.8 151.8 82.1
sao (5.1M) 111.7 126.8 66.8
samba (5.3M) 309.2 407.3 117.6
x-ray (5.8M) 109.4 202.4 94.2
webster (12M) 527.6 606.7 257.8
mozilla (19M) 800.0 825.5 354.4
In conclusion, our statistical detector performs the best
among all the detectors on both the quines and safe files.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we showed that deflate has an underlying
pseudo-language that is sufficiently rich to produce quines.
Moreover, the delfate specification gives several degrees
of freedom such as the possibility to insert any arbitrary
filename and create any block type of choice at any stage
of compression among many others. Quines clearly exploit
these liberties. Hence, it is much needed to redesign a new
unified specification that reduces the attack surface available
in deflate.
Our tests with several anti-viruses and incident response
frameworks show that most of them lack adequate archi-
tecture to efficiently detect quines. In face with this, we
studied two ad-hoc detectors: the recursive decompression
with bounded depth and the fixed-point detector. We also
proposed a new statistical detector. Recursive detector is
inefficient since it requires several calls to the decompres-
sion routine. Moreover, it has false positives as any archive
file which has a larger number of compressed files that the
hard-coded bound will be declared as unsafe. For some anti-
viruses the bound is as low as 6. The fixed-point detector
has no false positives and is more efficient on quines than
the recursion based detector. However it performs poorly
on a certain class of files. We have shown that such files
are very easy to construct due to the flexible nature of the
delfate specification. The proposed statistical detector is
the most efficient of all but entails false positives. Again
to the deflate specification, it is possible to somewhat in-
fluence the false positive rate. However, tests with several
datasets show that the false positive rate is very low.
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APPENDIX
A. FILE FORMAT SPECIFICATIONS
The deflate algorithm is implemented in three popular
compression routines, namely, gzip, zlib and zip. The first
two compression routines are very similar, while, zip, apart
from being a compression routine is also an archiver, i.e.,
it aggregates a collection of files and directories by storing
them into a single container. In this appendix, we present
the file format specification for each of these routines.
GZIP: A gzip compressed file as specified in RFC 1952 [6]
is composed of three mandatory parts and an optional part
(see Fig. 6a). The mandatory parts include a header fol-
lowed by the compressed data and a footer. The header is
collectively 10 bytes long and stores the gzip magic number
(two bytes for MAGIC NUMBER 0x1F8B), a 1-byte field to iden-
tify the compression method used (CM)6, another 1-byte field
for a flag meant to activate options (FLG), a 4-byte field for
the unix time at which the file was last modified (MTIME), a
one byte field for extra flags (XFLG) that is set depending on
the compression method and finally the last byte reserved to
indicate the operating system (OS). Depending on whether
some of the bits of FLG are set or not, there can be an op-
tional part which consists of three additional fields: XLEN
gives the length of the optional field, FNAME is the filename
and FCOMMENT is the file comment. FNAME and FCOMMENT ter-
minate with a 0x00 byte. The optional part is followed by
the actual compressed data blocks (COMPRESSED BLOCKS). A
gzip file ends with a mandatory footer composed of a 4-byte
cyclic redundancy code (CRC32) and the size of the uncom-
pressed file modulo 232 (FSIZE).
ZLIB: A zlib compressed file [5] has the same format as
that of a gzip compressed file, except that the magic num-
ber is different (0x789C) and that the CRC32 checksum is
replaced by ADLER32 which trades reliability for speed.
ZIP: In the description provided here, we do not take into
account the archiving ability of zip. In other words, we as-
sume that only a single file is zipped. The zip file format
as specified in [16] is shown in Fig. 6b. Under the stated
restriction, a zip compressed file is identified by a MAGIC
NUMBER, aka a file header signature which is a 4-byte field
(0x04034b50). It is followed by five 2-byte fields, namely, a
field that identifies the version needed to extract the data
(VS), a flag to store options (FLG), a field to identify the
compression method used (CM)7, a field to indicate the last
modification time of the file (MTIME) and another to indicate
the last modification date of the file (MDATE). This is followed
by three 4-byte fields, namely, a CRC32 checksum to check
file integrity (CRC32), a field to store the compressed file size
(CS) and another to store the uncompressed file size (UCS).
These size-related fields are followed by two 2-byte fields.
The first stores the filename length (FNLN), while the other
stores the length of the extra field (such as a file comment)
(XFL). Then, there are two fields of variable length to store
the filename and the extra field name (XFLNAME). This is fol-
lowed by the actual compressed data (COMPRESSED BLOCKS).
Finally, depending upon the bits of FLG, the file may have
three 4-byte fields, namely, CRC32, CS2 — a repetition of
the compressed file size CS and UCS2 — a repetition of the
uncompressed file size UCS.
B. BLOCK STRUCTURE OF KNOWN QUINES
6Apart from the deflate compression, other methods such
as LZH and pack (a deprecated compression algorithm based
on Huffman coding) are also supported.
7zip also implements LZMA, IBM LZ77, BZIP2.
MAGIC NUMBER CM FLG MTIME XFLG OS XLEN FNAME FCOMMENT COMPRESSED BLOCKS CRC32 FSIZE
header optional footercompressed data
variable length2B 1B 1B 4B 1B 1B 4B 4B
(a) A gzip compressed file.
MAGIC NUMBER VS FLG CM MTIME MDATE CRC32 CS UCS FNLN XFL FNAME XFNAME COMPRESSED BLOCKS CRC32 CS2 UCS2
header compressed data
data descriptor
(optional)
var. length4B 2B 2B 2B 2B 2B 4B 4B 4B 2B 2B 2B 2B 2B
(b) A zip compressed file.
Figure 6: File format of a gzip and zip compressed file.
(a) rec_tst.gz.
(b) r.gzip.
(c) r.gz.
(d) r.tar.gz.
Figure 7: Block structure for different quines. The gray blocks correspond to uncompressed (stored) blocks and the light
gray are compressed with the static Huffman table (static blocks).
Table 9: Canterbury corpus.
Filename Description Type Filesize (KB)
alice29.txt Alice in Wonderland English text 148
asyoulik.txt Shakespeare’s play English text 122
cp.html sample HTML HTML 24
fields.c sample C source C 10
grammar.lsp list LISP source 3
kennedy.xls sample Excel Excel spreadsheet 1005
lcet10.txt technical writing text 416
plrabn12.txt poem text 470
pt5 fax CCITT 501
sum SPARC SPARC executable 37
xargs.1 GNU man page man 4
Table 10: Silesia corpus.
Filename Description Type Filesize (MB)
dickens collected works of Charles Dickens English text 9.7
mozilla tarred executable of Mozilla 1.0 exe 48.8
mr medical magnetic resonance image picture 9.5
nci chemical database database 32
ooffice dll from Open Office.org 1.01 exe 5.9
osdb database in MySQL format from Open Source Database Benchmark database 9.6
reymont text of the book Ch lopi by W ladys law Reymont Polish pdf 6.32
samba tarred source code of Samba 2-2.3 src 20.6
sao SAO star catalog binary 6.9
webster Webster Unabridged Dictionary (1913) html 39.5
xml XML files html 5
x-ray X-ray image image 8
Fig. 7a, Fig. 7b, Fig. 7c, Fig. 7d, present the block struc-
ture for rec_tst.gz, r.gzip,r.gz and r.tar.gz respectively.
C. COMPRESSION CORPORA
We present details on the Canterbury and Silesia com-
pression corpora in Table 9 and Table 10 respectively.
